Malcolm Brown
During the 1980s, the theologian John Atherton took part in a series of conversations at 10 Downing Street. Chaired by the prime minister, Margret Thatcher, and bringing together Conservative enthusiasts for her free-market economic project and senior Anglican theologians, the seminars sought to build understanding between a church and a party that were often at loggerheads. Atherton described the final dinner:
Members shared their judgement of the whole process. I ventured to describe how I had been helped greatly to understand market systems better. I regarded it as a significant contribution to a continuing "personal intellectual pilgrimage." I waited for the conservative members of the group to share how they too had changed their minds as part of the rich process of dialogue. Sadly, not a glimmer of such change emerged in their presentation. 1 Good conversation does not require every mind to be changed. But it helps if all concerned are open to the possibility of changing their minds. Reading these four essays, I confess to sharing a similar sadness to Atherton's of thirty years ago. Andy Hartropp is spot on in identifying both the necessity and the difficulty of bringing economics and theology into creative conversation. But on the evidence before us, there is a long way to go.
I start with some comments on Michael Pollitt's paper, as it is not untypical of many that I have read over the years that assume or assert that church people venturing into the field of economics are ill informed, sentimental, and out of touch. These are damning criticisms, and delivered extremely robustly.
Since good dialogue is not helped by excessive timidity, I welcome the chance to respond with an equivalent robustness. Theology and economics can, in my view, engage in dialogue as equals. But, even on his own account of economics, Pollitt reveals some real problems about how economists engage in interdisciplinary dialogue.
Pollitt sets up a series of Aunt Sallies that, naturally, he has little difficulty demolishing. He lists a number of "misconceptions" that, he says, are the kind of things church people or theologians say. As he cites no sources, it is just his word against mine when I say that I don't recognize the picture he paints. He also critiques a number of themes in Church of England statements. But these are derived from a secondary source (Eve Poole's book) that, unfortunately (as I noted in a review), takes Synodical motions out of their wider context as if every motion was a statement of the whole church's position.
Pollitt certainly has his epistemological defenses firmly in place. He tells us that "Economic upheaval or bad economic outcomes don't discredit the intellectual apparatus of economics." I suppose an analogy would be to say that mathematical miscalculation, resulting in the collapse of a bridge with much loss of life, does not discredit mathematics. But that raises a number of questions: First, is economics a subject analogous to mathematics (that is, is the intellectual apparatus of economics so law-like that it can really disclaim responsibility for the way things work out in practice)? Secondly, if Pollitt is right, those who criticize economic outcomes cannot be criticizing economics itself-so why does he bother to defend economics against them? 2 Interestingly, Pollitt and Hartropp take differing positions about the nature of economics as a predictive science. Hartropp tells us that "Economists are very interested in predicting human behaviour." That locates economics as one of the humanities, which is where the discipline started. But if Pollitt is right, and bad economic outcomes do not discredit economics but merely "provide new data to which the tools of the economist need to be applied," then economics is not predictive at all but merely descriptive. The first bears moral responsibility while the second does not, and this crucially affects the way theology can dialogue with economics.
Hartropp gives a good account of rational choice and stresses that, while economists seek to make broad generalizations about how people in general can behave (reasonable predictions, that is, about how most people behave most of the time), they are not asserting either that such behavior is good or that individuals may not behave differently. But if economics is the kind of closed system that Pollitt seems to be describing, which fits every bit of evidence into a seamless explanatory framework, there appears to be no behavior that would challenge or disprove a well-formulated economic model. The effect is to make Pollitt's framework unassailable to critique.
This brings us to Hartropp and Pollitt's objections to the interventions of church spokespeople. Unfortunately, neither has dug deeply enough behind
